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I estimate that the underlying beliefs about validity average from 0.55 to 0.70 for litigated
patents. For a number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations, I show that Type I errors (ﬁnding a valid patent
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implications of the model address patent value.
Keywords: patents, uncertainty, litigation, innovation, event study
JEL codes: L19, L29, O32, O34, K41Learning by Suing: Structural Estimates
of Court Errors in Patent Litigation
“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean
by the law.”
–Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The Path of the Law, Part I.
1 Introduction
Courts make mistakes. That is a fact. It is plainly accepted by legal scholars and laymen alike;
so much so that it is pointless to argue it. Appellate courts would not even exist if it were not so.
Furthermore, the theoretical consequences of court errors have been well known at least since Priest
and Klein (1984). For instance, uncertain legal standards or awards can lead to changes in observed
selection rates and win rates (Waldfogel 1995, Rasmusen 1995). An uncertain legal standard can
lead to over-precaution on the part of an injurer. At their worst, severely error-prone courts can
diminish or eliminate any intended incentives from the justice system (Landes and Posner 2001);
if violators and non-violators are equally likely to be found in violation, the deterrence mechanism
fails completely and courts become deadweight. Less egregious errors will soften deterrence eﬀects.
Empirically, the incidence of litigation is well studied (Stanley and Coursey 1990, Waldfogel
1995, Eisenberg and Farber 1997, Siegelman and Waldfogel 1999), including several studies relating
to patent law in particular (Lanjouw and Lerner 1998, Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001, Allison,
Lemley, Moore, and Trunkey 2004, Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004, Marco 2005). Scholars in the
patent literature have also studied the outcomes of patent trials (Allison and Lemley 1998, Marco
2004, Sherry and Teece 2004, Henry and Turner 2006).
On the other hand, the frequency with which courts err is another matter entirely. There is little
or no evidence on actual error rates because they are inherently unobservable (were it otherwise,
courts would presumably correct their mistakes immediately). Thus, the extent to which courts err
is an empirical question heretofore unanswered in the literature. This paper attempts to remedy that
by investigating court errors in the context of patent litigation, by relying on observable features
of patent litigation that are inﬂuenced by court error: namely, trial win rates and stock market
reactions to trial outcomes.
1Legal uncertainty is inevitable in a patent rights system (Lemley and Shapiro 2005). Uncertainty
over whether a “title” to property can be enforced will undermine its market value: the title is only
as good as the ability to enforce it.1 Legal uncertainty is especially pervasive in emerging technology
areas (or emerging patenting areas, like business methods and software patents). Where uncertainty
is prevalent, the eﬀects on appropriation and ﬁrm behavior can be dramatic. Since the purpose of
a patent system is to provide incentives for research, innovation, and diﬀusion by creating rewards,
an inability to appropriate those rewards diminishes the very incentives for which the system was
designed.
Intellectual property managers face decisions about whether to patent innovations, and how to
manage market transactions in intellectual property (Lerner 1995, Hall and Ziedonis 2001, Grindley
and Teece 1997). If property rights are well-deﬁned, ﬁrms may organize transactions through arm’s
length negotiations. In uncertain legal environments, we expect to see more integrated transactions
ranging from cross-licensing, to strategic alliances, to consolidation. To the extent that uncertainty
aﬀects or drives these decisions, it is of great strategic importance to ﬁrms. And, to the extent that
policy makers have some control over the amount of legal uncertainty, or legal “quality” as coined
by Merges (1999), it is an important and understudied policy instrument (Lemley 2001). Simulation
estimates (Lanjouw 1994, Lanjouw 1998) ﬁnd that changes in patent law or the legal environment
can signiﬁcantly change the value of patent protection, not just for litigated patents, but for all
patents even if none are ever litigated.2 Additionally, one can expect the value of patent rights
to evolve as information about the validity and scope of a patent evolve (Sherry and Teece 2004),
especially through court decisions.
Legal uncertainty is introduced into a patent system by the administrative agency (the Patent
and Trademark Oﬃce–PTO–in the US, Lemley (2001), Cockburn, Kortum, and Stern (2002))
1Illustrative examples of the importance of property rights enforcement can be found in television portrayals of
the “Old West.” In 1859, a title to land in Virginia was more valuable than one in Nevada, in part because of the
“underlying value of the land,”–closer to transportation and markets, more fertile, etc. However, Virginia land was
also more valuable because better enforcement mechanisms were in place there. On the TV series Bonanza, the value
of the Ponderosa ranch was due in part to the quality of the land for grazing cattle, and in part to the ability of
the Cartwrights to enforce their title–whether through formal institutions (the local constabulary) or self-help (the
number of able-bodied Cartwrights available during the episode). See Ellickson (1991) for an excellent discussion of
formal versus informal dispute resolution.
2For example, Lanjouw estimates that if the underlying probability of success for a plaintiﬀ fell from 75% to 50%,
and legal fees doubled, then the average patent value would be halved in her simulation, even if no cases were litigated.
2and by legal institutions. Because of the importance of enforcement on the value of intellectual
property, many researchers in the US have pointed to the establishment of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in 1982 as a watershed in the rights of patent holders. The CAFC
established–among other things–a single court that would hear the appeals of patent cases from
all federal district courts (state courts do not hear patent cases). It is claimed that the CAFC
strengthened the rights of patent holders–that the court is more “pro-patent” than its district peers
(Lerner 1994, Lanjouw 1994, Lanjouw and Shankerman 1997, Kortum and Lerner 1999, Lanjouw
and Schankerman 2001, Henry and Turner 2006), so that we can expect a shift in the legal standard
in the early 1980s, perhaps increasing beliefs that a patent will be held valid and infringed, and
perhaps decreasing the rate at which mistakes were made with regard to validity and infringement
suits.
It is these two sources of uncertainty–the PTO and the courts–that I will examine in the model
and the estimation below. The PTO alters beliefs about the validity of patents. Courts are believed
to err with some frequency, which alters beliefs about whether the patent will win a case on validity.
When courts err at all, the probability of winning a validity ruling is not generally equal to the
probability that the patent is valid.
Changes in the institutions governing patents can increase or decrease the uncertainty over the
scope and validity of patents, and we must recognize that this uncertainty will have eﬀects on ﬁrms’
incentives to litigate, license, do R&D, and to patent in certain areas. Lerner (1994) ﬁnds that the
“shadow” of litigation may change the patenting behavior of ﬁrms; in particular, high-litigation-cost
ﬁrms may target “less crowded” technology areas in order to avoid disputes. These eﬀects may be
large, and may be an important part of the patent system. For this reason, it is important to have
an understanding of the quantitative impact of uncertainty on the value of patent rights.
The current political attention on tort reform in the US is evidence that policy-makers recognize
the policy dimension of legal uncertainty on a broad scale. Since it is expensive for the administrative
agency to authenticate every patent, it may want to depend on individual ﬁrms to enforce their own
patents: it need not investigate each patent in depth. It may be more cost eﬀective to introduce
some degree of uncertainty into the system as to the validity and scope of patents (Lemley 2001). In
this way, expenditure on each granted patent will be reduced, and only those which are in dispute
will be investigated (in court) at further cost. One can therefore expect the socially optimal amount
of uncertainty to be positive.
3This paper presents structural estimates of market participants’ beliefs about court errors and
patent validity in the US. I make use of stock market reactions to court decisions in order to
estimate the magnitude of changes in beliefs about patent validity. It is from litigating that market
participants “learn” about the validity of patents from the court, and update their beliefs accordingly.
The results are very provocative. Using a number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations, I ﬁnd that litigated
patents are believed to be valid approximately 55% to 70% of the time. Further, I ﬁnd that the win
rate for valid patents is believed to be 75 to 80%; the win rate for invalid patents is ranges more
broadly from near zero to over 40%. I make use of these estimates to compare the value of patent
grants to the value of patent litigation. I ﬁnd that litigated patents are worth over $20 million dollars
at birth, and that patent litigation is worth $3 million to $5 million on average.
In the next section, I present a simple model of patent litigation and uncertainty that yields an
estimable structural equation. The model enables me to interpret market reactions to news about
patent issuance and patent litigation. By examining the diﬀerential impacts of market reactions to
wins and losses, I can infer the market’s implicit beliefs about patent validity, patent value, and
court errors. Section 3 lays out the econometric speciﬁcation based on the model, and Section 4
describes the patent data, litigation data, and event study results. In Section 5, I estimate several
diﬀerent speciﬁcations and compare the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
The model assumes that the patent oﬃce and the courts may err. Both forms of uncertainty will
be embedded in the market value of patents–and, thus, the market value of ﬁrms. I assume that
the market has belief α that a given patent is valid. Courts err with a probability known to market
participants, so that when a patent is litigated parties will update their beliefs about α according
to Bayes’ Rule (by which they incorporate the error rates of the courts).
More formally, let the prior belief about validity be α0. Further, let w1 = Pr(win|valid) be the
probability that a valid patent is found valid and w2 = Pr(win|invalid) be the probability that an
invalid patent is found valid. Thus, the court makes a Type I error with probability 1 − w1 and
a Type II error with probability w2. I assume throughout that w1 > w2 so that the signal by the
court is meaningful; however, this assumption is not enforced in the empirical speciﬁcation.
The initial belief that the patent will win in court is given by
4p0 = w1α0 + w2(1 − α0) = w2 + α0 (w1 − w2). (1)
If a patent is litigated to trial, the court will announce a binary decision: either the patent “wins”
or “loses,” according to whether the patent is found valid (technically: not invalid) or invalid. Thus,
the model treats validity independent from infringement. There are several justiﬁcations for doing
so. First, validity decisions are clearly deﬁned, whereas infringement decisions contain more noise.
That is, infringement decisions depend not only upon the patent itself, but also the technology used
by the infringer. In contrast, validity decisions are a function only of patent characteristics. Further,
research has shown that patent litigation can be viewed as a unilateral decision on the part of the
patent holder (Marco 2005), and that validity is a common defense raised by infringers (Allison and
Lemley 1998, Marco 2004). So, a patent holder knows that it will risk invalidity when it litigates a
patent, and it should expect a decision on validity.
Beliefs about validity are updated based on the court’s known propensity to err. The updated
belief, α1, can take on one of two values, depending on whether the patent wins or loses on validity.






p0 α0 with probability p0
1−w1
1−p0 α0 with probability 1 − p0
(2)






p0 α0 (w1 − w2) with probability p0
w2 +
(1−w1)
1−p0 α0 (w1 − w2) with probability 1 − p0
. (3)
Note that prior to the ruling, Eα1 = α0 and Ep1 = p0. This is important when considering the
empirical results below. The day before a decision, beliefs are α0, which reﬂect the expected updated
beliefs about validity. The initial values α0 and p0 should be interpreted as those that exist just
prior to a decision. Clearly beliefs about α and p may change over the life of the patent. The model
restricts attention only to information that is revealed by the verdict. Thus, when a decision is made
by the court, beliefs change discretely–unless someone has rigged the jury or bribed a judge.
The change in the belief about winning can be written as
∆pwin = p1 − p0 = w2 +
w1
p0
(w1 − w2)α0 − p0 (4)
5if the patent holder wins, and
∆ploss = p1 − p0 = w2 +
1 − w1
1 − p0
(w1 − w2)α0 − p0 (5)














(p0 − w2) after a loss
. (6)
In this speciﬁcation, ∆p is not explicitly a function of α0, although α0 enters through p0. This fact
is exploited in order to form an empirical speciﬁcation.
To investigate changes in patent value based on market responses, I assume that the value of the
patent at time t is
vt = ptzt (7)
where p is deﬁned above, and z is the scope of the patent, measured as the discounted stream of
proﬁts accruing to the patent holder assuming the patent is known with certainty to be valid. The
value pz represents a straightforward valuation of the property right to the patent holder. If p and z
are common knowledge, then the Nash bargaining solution of the license negotiation game is pz. This
speciﬁcation assumes away signaling, litigation costs, and imperfect enforcement. Other valuation
methods may represent the value as a non-linear function of p and z (see Marco (2005) for a more
sophisticated analysis of patent value in a real options setting).3
At the time of a court decision on validity, only p will change. That is, the underlying value
of the technology is unlikely to change overnight, and any change in value must be attributed to
updated beliefs about validity. Thus, for a validity decision at time τ
∆vτ = ∆p · zτ. (8)
3 Empirical Speciﬁcation
I use equation 8 to interpret changes in ﬁrm value on the day of a court decision. Patent litigation is
an especially useful area of law in which to examine market responses. First–as mentioned earlier–
3While this formulation is greatly simpliﬁed relative to a world with imperfect enforcement, the purpose is to
develop a model with which to interpret revelations by the court about validity. For litigated patents, parties may be
assumed to have already updated beliefs about the ability of the patent holder to enforce its patent rights.
6validity is a binary decision.4 Second, there is little or no leakage prior to the announcement of the
decision. Third, all the new information about the patent pertains to changes in beliefs about
validity as opposed to the patented technology.
For patent i born at time 0 and adjudicated at time τ, the formal econometric speciﬁcation
becomes
∆fτ,i = ∆pτ,i · zτ,i + ετ,i (9)













(p0 − w2)DNV , (10)
and the patent value is estimated as
zτ,i = β0 + β1 · ∆f−1,i + β1 · ∆f0,i + β3 · forward + β4 · age + β5 · age2. (11)
The Ds are indicator variables for the court decision: valid and not valid. The patent underlying
patent value–or scope–is measured as a linear function of several covariates. ∆f−1,i and ∆f0,i
are estimates of the excess returns (unanticipated change in the value of the value of the ﬁrm) to
the patent holder on the day of patent application and issuance, respectively. These variables are
included because they are likely to be correlated with the underlying patent value, but not perfectly
so. News about patents may be revealed to the market before or after patent application. And, while
applications are not public information in the U.S., there is likely to be some leakage of information.
Further, applications are not guaranteed to result in patents; the information contained near patent
issuance may have to do with updating beliefs about issuance, or it may have to do with information
about the innovation itself, as contained in the public documents. Equation 11 also includes the
number of forward citations received by the patent at the time of adjudication, and the age of
the patent at the time of adjudication. Greater forward citations are likely to indicate increased
patent value, but age is likely to decrease it due to obsolescence (depreciation) or anticipated patent
expiration. I include a squared term on age to allow for an inﬂection point in its impact on value.
Equation 11 presents a linear approximation for value. However, I also estimate an alternative
speciﬁcation:
4There are a handful of decisions where a patent is found valid in part and not valid in part. Those cases are
excluded from my sample.
7The patent value at the patent’s birth is estimated to be a linear function of the change in
the value of the ﬁrm on the day of patent grant, with unknown parameters β0 and β1. This
speciﬁcation acknowledges that some information about the patent may leak into the market prior
to patent issuance and that market valuations reﬂect only changes in expectations about the value
of the patent. Thus, I estimate the initial value of the patent as a linear function of the size of the
response on the date of issuance, z0 = β0 + β1∆f0. The scope at time τ is depreciated by e−rτ
to account for changes in the value of the patent right because of either an aging patent right or
obsolescence.
zτ,i = (β0 + β1 · ∆f−1,i + β1 · ∆f0,i + β3 · forward)e−r·age. (12)
The speciﬁcation is identical to that above, except that it allows the patent to literally depreciate
(or appreciate) as a function of age.5
Estimating the model requires several pieces of information:
1. The change in patent value at time τ (∆fτ). I measure this below using an event study
methodology to calculate the excess returns to patent decisions. This is the dependent variable.
2. An estimate of the value of the patent prior to litigation. I estimate this by calculating the
excess returns at the time of application and at issuance. I also utilize forward citations and
age.
3. An estimate of the probability of winning in court (p0). This is estimated in section 4 using a
simple probit.
The estimation routine utilized is non-linear least squares, where the parameters to be estimated
are w1, w2, the β’s and in some speciﬁcations, r. The win rates, w1 and w2 are modeled with several
diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The simplest speciﬁcations treat them as simple constants. However, I also
allow them to vary on the basis of whether the court is an appellate court, and whether the decision
5The depreciation rate r is not constrained to be positive. A negative estimated value for r would indicate that
the patent has appreciated, perhaps because new uses have been discovered for the technology. While this is possible,
or even probable, while the technology is young, the value of the patent right (as opposed to the patented technology)
will certainly decline at some point prior to expiration.
8is made before or after the establishment of the Federal Circuit:
w1 = w10 + w11 · appeal + w12 · preCAFC (13)
w2 = w20 + w21 · appeal + w22 · preCAFC (14)
A more complicated speciﬁcation constrains the win rates to be between zero and one by utilizing a
logit-like formulation:
w1 = 1/(1 + exp(−(w10 + w11 · appeal + w12 · preCAFC))) (15)
w2 = 1/(1 + exp(−(w20 + w21 · appeal + w22 · preCAFC))) (16)
The speciﬁcation is agnostic as to whether beliefs about validity. The notation implies that
beliefs about validity and the win rate the day before the decision are equal to the beliefs at time
0 (as indicated by the subscript 0). However, the observed win rate is measured empirically as of
the day before the decision (τ − 1), so that I measure only the change in beliefs due to the court’s
decision.
The estimated probability of winning, p0, can vary signiﬁcantly from one case to the next. If
court error rates are constant, so that w1 and w2 are constant across the estimation, then diﬀerent
p0’s imply diﬀerent α0’s across the model. Because α0 does not explicitly enter the estimation
equation, I am able to impute the distribution of α0 using observed p0’s and the estimated w1 and




In the following subsections I describe the sample of litigated patents, the description of court
decisions, the calculation of excess returns (on adjudications and patent grants), and the estimation
of the probability of validity.
4.1 Adjudication data
My data begin with a database compiled by researchers at the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) and Case Western Reserve University (CWRU) (Hall, Jaﬀe, and Trajtenberg 2000).6 My
6My thanks to Bronwyn Hall for permitting access to the data.
9sample consists of over 417,000 patents owned by publicly traded US manufacturing ﬁrms. The
patents are assigned Cusip identiﬁers using the 1989 ownership structure of the patent holder.
Litigation data were hand-collected from the United States Patents Quarterly (USPQ) for de-
cisions published 1977-1997.7 The USPQ publishes annual indices containing patents on which
adjudications were published in that year. USPQ contains only “published” adjudications, which
is a subset of all adjudications. However, the advantage of the USPQ is that it contains clear in-
formation on the disposition of the case with regard to validity and infringement. The USPQ data
were merged with the NBER/CWRU data to obtain a list of adjudicated patents owned by publicly
traded ﬁrms.
The merged data contain 701 case citations involving 670 patents. The disposition data were en-
tered for each adjudication containing decisions relevant to validity. Adjudications involving prelim-
inary motions about discovery, jurisdiction, etc. were discarded. Also, PTO interference proceedings
and examination proceedings were not used. When a USPQ citation made explicit reference to an
earlier related decision, I incorporated that case into the data.
The ﬁnal adjudication data consist of 390 decisions involving 413 patents owned by 158 publicly
traded ﬁrms. An observation in my data is a “decision-patent.” For example, a single case may
involve four patents. Of the decision-patents, 385 involved a distinguishable decision on validity.
About half of the cases involve only one decision-patent. The implied litigation rates are given in
Table 1, where case ﬁling data was calculated using LitAlert.8
Unfortunately, stock market returns are available for only a portion of my sample. Returns for
the date of adjudication are available for 475 decision-patents. Of those, 303 represent decisions on
matters of validity. Returns data for patent issuance and application dates are available for 179 of
the 303 decision-patents.
4.2 Excess returns
In order to be able to analyze the adjudications using my methodology, I require an estimate of
stock market reactions to news about the patents. I obtained CRSP data on daily stock returns
from the Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS). I use cumulative abnormal returns–or excess
returns–as measured by event studies to measure the stock market reactions to patent decisions
7See Allison and Lemley (1998). I thank Mark Lemley for the reference to USPQ.
8It is likely that both ﬁling data and adjudication data are under-reported.
10and patent issuance.
Event studies are appropriate for several reasons. First, the model provides a way to interpret
the probability that a patent is valid as a function of changes in patent value. Changes in value are
precisely what event studies are designed to measure. Second, while event studies have been used by
researchers to investigate the eﬀects of other types of litigation (Bhagat, Brickley, and Coles 1994),
no study has concentrated on patent litigation.9 Market reactions provide information that has not
been previously incorporated into the patent value (and consequently, the value of the ﬁrm). Third,
litigation events are well identiﬁed: court records for published decisions identify the date of the
decision. Last, litigation events can be directly associated with changes in beliefs about the legal
patent right. If a patent is ruled to be valid, nothing about the decision aﬀects the value of the
underlying technology, so the change in value reﬂects changes in beliefs about the uncertainty over
property rights.
In order to estimate Equation 9, I need to calculate a measure for the market reaction to the
litigation event, and to patent issuance. So, the output of the event studies forms the dependent
variable and an independent variable for the estimation equation. Appendix A describes the em-
pirical methodology for event studies in detail. The excess returns are summarized in Table (2) for
two-day event windows (the day of the event and the day after) and for 11-day event windows (from
ﬁve days prior to ﬁve days after the event).10
We expect the market returns to be somewhat noisy despite the precision of the event date. First,
ﬁrms diﬀer in size, so reactions to good or bad news about patents will vary not only according to
revision in beliefs, but also according to the ﬁrm’s market capitalization. Large ﬁrms will have
smaller responses, ceteris paribus. In the estimation I use both excess returns and dollar amounts.
The results are fairly consistent across speciﬁcations, but there are some diﬀerences that I describe in
Section (5). However, it is useful here to get a bearing on the dollar amount of the excess returns.11
First, note that the 11-day returns make more sense with regard to sign than the two-day
returns. That is, with 11-day returns invalidity decisions are unambiguous bad news, and validity
decisions and patent grants are unambiguous good news. The implication is that both adjudication
9Austin (1993) uses event studies to examine market reactions to patent issuance.
10I calculate excess returns of litigation for 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 day event windows. Patent issuance and
application returns are estimated for the same windows, except that I leave out the 1-day returns.
11Dollar values are obtained by multiplying the abnormal return by the market value of the ﬁrm.
11information and patent grant information take some time to ﬁlter into the markets. The mean
11-day return to a validity decision is $61.5 million. Similarly, the mean 11-day return to a patent
application is $31.1 million. Issuance is similar.
To put this in context, compare these reactions to the CAR estimates of patent issuance done
by Austin (1993). He ﬁnds that excess returns range from a mean of about $500,000 for the full
sample, to a mean of $33 million for those patents mentioned in the Wall Street Journal.
4.3 Probability of validity
To calculate the probability of validity, I run a simple probit on my sample in the spirit of Marco
(2004) and Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001). Appendix (B) describes the estimation in detail. From
the estimated probit, I predict the probability that a patent will win and use this as a dependent
variable in the estimation.
Note that the estimated probability of validity is conditional upon having been litigated; it does
not control for self-selection. Because my model estimates market reactions on a sample of patents
that are known to be in court, the conditional probability is appropriate. This implies that the
resulting estimation for the probability of validity will also need to be interpreted as conditional on
selection. See the Appendix for more details.
5 Results
There are two econometric problems that arise in the estimations. The ﬁrst is that are multiple
measurements of the dependent variable and the independent variable, in the form of diﬀerent event
windows. Excess returns for adjudication are measured with one, two, three, ﬁve, seven, nine, and
11 day event windows. Excess returns for application date and issuance date use similar windows,
but without one-day returns. It is diﬃcult to form a prior about which window is appropriate.
Larger event windows will contain more information, but at the expense of precision. Further, the
appropriate window may vary on a case by case basis. The number of permutations for the three
measurements of excess returns is over 250 (7 × 6 × 6).
For this reason, I implement a bootstrapping technique. For each estimation, I create 200
bootstrap replicates of size 179 (the sample size). For each replicate, I randomly choose event
12windows for of the three excess returns used in the estimation. Thus, the coeﬃcients and standard
errors of the estimates reﬂect the range of errors captured in the diﬀerent event windows.
The second econometric problem deals with multiple “patents-in-suit.” Where there are multiple
patents litigated in one suit, the interpretation of excess returns is ambiguous. If one patent is
ruled valid, and another ruled invalid, then the change in the ﬁrm’s market valuation will reﬂect
conﬂicting news. Alternatively, if both patents are ruled valid, then the change in the ﬁrm’s market
valuation will reﬂect compounded good news. There are (at least) two approaches for dealing with
this problem. First, one could attempt to use a missing data technique such as the EM Algorithm
to impute the share of the excess returns contributed by each patent-in-suit. However, because my
estimation relies on bootstrapping, conditioning on other patents-in-suit becomes diﬃcult. Instead,
I rely on the bootstrapping to properly account for the standard error in the estimation. On any
given day, there are multiple sources of new information about a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability. Any given piece
of information may be good or bad news. To the extent that other information creates noise in the
estimation, it aﬀects only the precision of the estimates. However, the estimates remain unbiased. If
the information is highly correlated with the known event, then the estimates may become biased.
This is a concern in the case at hand, because the outcome of patents litigated jointly may be jointly
determined. Nonetheless, in unreported regressions, I implement the EM Algorithm with speciﬁc
event windows and I obtain similar results to those presented below.
5.1 Court error
The results of the estimations are presented in tables 5 to 7. Table 5 represents a linear speciﬁcation
for w1 and w2 (the win rate for valid and invalid patents, respectively) and a linear speciﬁcation for
patent scope. Columns 1 and 2 use excess returns as the dependent variable, and columns 3 and 4
use the dollar value of the excess returns as the dependent variable. Columns 1 and 3 use a simple
constant to estimate w1 and w2, whereas columns 2 and 4 allow the win rates to vary based on
equations 13 and 14. By using a linear speciﬁcation, w1 and w2 are not constrained to be between
zero and one. Thus, the magnitudes of these parameters serve as a test of the model.
Table 6 presents models similar to table 5, but with a logit speciﬁcation for w1 and w2 as deﬁned
in equations 15 and 16. Table 7 presents an alternative speciﬁcation for scope, according to equation
12.
13The results from table 5 show highly signiﬁcant results. The estimated probability that a valid
patent will be found valid is approximately 0.70 to 0.77 in the simply models. In the more complete
models, the probability increases to 0.8 to 1.0, for lower court decisions. The fact that these estimates
fall within the zero to one range supports the theoretical model. Note that the appeals court is
believed to err with greater frequency than the lower court, as evidenced by the negative estimates
for w11 (only column 2 is signiﬁcant).
The excess returns estimations show that courts are believed to rule invalid patents valid about
20% of the time, and that appeals and the pre-CAFC era do not appear to inﬂuence this ﬁgure.
The dollar estimations show insigniﬁcant results overall for w2, but a negative impact from appeals
(meaning less error) and a positive impact of the pre-CAFC era.
The logit formulations for win rates in table 6 show consistent results across the speciﬁcations
(for lower courts). A value for w11 of 0.95 to 1.4 implies a value for w1 of 0.72 to 0.80,12 consistent
with table 5. The eﬀects of appeals and the 1982 reforms are inconsistent across the speciﬁcations.
The believed win rate of a valid patent at the appellate level ranges widely from 0.53 to 0.86.
The win rate for invalid patents is much lower than for valid patents, however the variance is
much higher across speciﬁcations. For a lower court decision the estimates range from as low as 0.05
to as high as 0.57. On average, appellate courts are believed to err less on invalid patents than the
lower courts.
Table 7 shows both linear and logit speciﬁcations for the alternative patent value model. The
win rates are modeled with a constant only. Again, the constant in the linear speciﬁcations can be
interpreted as a probability. The results show again very consistent results for the win rate for valid
patents: approximately 0.75-0.82. The win rate for invalid patents again is inconsistently estimated,
ranging from near zero to as high as 0.41.
As discussed in section 3, estimates for w1 and w2 imply a distribution for α0 based on p0,
α0 =
p0−w2
w1−w2. Figures 1 and 2 show this relationship. The distribution of the bootstrap replicates
for the model parameters w1 and w2 are shown in ﬁgure 1, for model 1 (table 5, column 1). Recall
12w11 can vary over the reals and still obtain values for w1 between zero and one.
1/(1 + exp(−0.95)) ￿ 0.72
1/(1 + exp(−1.4)) ￿ 0.80
14that the parameters are not constrained to be between zero and one. Nonetheless, the vast majority
of the estimates fall within those bounds. Additionally, w1 is visibly greater than w2. Using the
medians of those distributions (w1 = 0.74, w2 = 0.34), α0 can be calculated for each observation.
That distribution is shown in ﬁgure 2. Again, α0 is not constrained to be between zero and one. The
distribution is evidently wider than those for w1 and w2, however a 95% conﬁdence interval for α is
(0.55,0.70) with mean 0.62.It should be pointed out that this value is subject to selection bias. We
cannot infer from this sample that the average patent has a “true” probability of validity of 0.62.
However, the court errors may be less subject to the selection bias. If the court has a certain
propensity to err, regardless of the case, then the estimates are not subject to selection bias. However,
if the court has a diﬀerent rate of error for the cases it sees, relative to the population of patents,
then the selection bias would be an issue.
5.2 Patent value
The structural estimation enables the separation of two components of patent value: beliefs about
validity and court error; and, what I have been calling the patent scope. By separating these two
components, it is possible to divine information about the value of the innovation, as opposed to the
enforceable patent right. If scope is what the patent is worth if it is perfectly enforceable, this value
should lie closer to the underlying technological value of the innovation. Because scope represents
a perfectly enforceable patent right, it may still underestimate the social value of the innovation
if there are any technological spillovers that are not appropriable even under perfect enforcement.
However, it is a much closer representation than the actual patent right, which reﬂects uncertainty
in validity and in legal protections.
Two parameters in the value speciﬁcation have consistent eﬀects throughout the 12 models in
tables 5 to 7: returns at date of issuance and forward citations. Both parameters are positively
correlated with patent scope, which is unsurprising. The other parameters have inconsistent signs
throughout the models.
At the median values of the β’s, it is possible to estimate the patent scope at the time of litigation
for the sample patents. Based on the median β’s in model 3 (table 5, column 3), the mean patent
scope at the time of litigation is approximately $130 million, with a 95% conﬁdence interval of $61
million to $199 million.
15Some simple calculations underscore the quantitative importance of uncertainty to patent holders.
Taking the following values as approximations for the model parameter values, one can calculate the





Based on these parameters, the believed probability of winning is p0 = α0w1 +(1−α0)w2 = 0.54.13
The value of the patent right is then $70 million. If the patent holder wins the case, beliefs will
be updated to p1 = 0.67. This represents a return to the patent holder of $16.9 million due to the
resolution of uncertainty. If the patent holder loses, p falls to p1 = 0.38, which represents a loss
of $20.8 million. If these calculations are at all accurate, the resolution of uncertainty is worth
approximately 10-15% of the technological value of the innovation, and 20-30% of the value of the
patent right. The resolution of uncertainty would clearly be worth more, if the courts erred less
than 25% of the time.
6 Conclusion
That courts err is not news to anyone–legal scholars and laymen alike. However, to this point there
has been no empirical estimates investigating the frequency with which courts err. The reason for
this empirical omission is obvious: error rates are inherently unobservable. However, by utilizing
information from stock market reactions to patent litigation decisions and to patent grants, I am
able to structurally estimate court errors, as well as patent value. In interpreting the results it
is important to remember that the results on patent validity and patent value are subject to self-
selection. However the court error rates are not subject to the same self-selection in that they are
treated as exogenous to the decision-making of the litigating parties.
Several speciﬁcations used the equivalent of a linear probability model to estimate court errors.
The fact that the estimates were consistently and signiﬁcantly between zero and one, and that the
estimates lined up closely with constrained estimates, lends credibility to the model.
13Note that this value is very close to the Priest and Klein limiting win rate of 50%.
16With regard to patents in particular, litigated patents appear to be self-selected from a pool of
fairly “low α” patents, with the belief about validity being about 0.62 at the mean. Combined with
the estimates of court errors, I ﬁnd that the mean litigated patent has close to a 50% chance of
winning in court, consistent with Priest and Klein (1984). Interestingly, the results on the appellate
court are mixed; in some speciﬁcations the beliefs about the “pro-patent” appeals court suggest that
the court favors patent holders less than lower courts do.
My estimates of Type I errors (false negatives) are very stable, around 20-25%. The estimates of
Type II errors (false positives) vary widely, perhaps representing more uncertainty in the market’s
beliefs surrounding court error for invalid patents. These results are of import to anyone interested
in legal reform, including policy makers interested in tort reform. Any positive error rates by courts
will necessarily dampen–to a greater or lesser extent–the impacts of reforms.
The theoretical model enabled me to decompose patent value into the legal right and the value of
the underlying technology. Resolving some uncertainty about validity through “learning by suing”
is worth about 10%-15% of the value of the average innovation, or 20-30% of the average value of
the patent right.
Extensions to the model presented in this paper could include the accounting for infringement
decisions as a means to change the legal scope of the patent. Additionally, more is necessary to
determine the exact eﬀect of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and whether there are
jurisdictional diﬀerences. These extension would require a richer dataset than the one used in this
paper. I leave that to future research.
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20A Event studies
The market model is the model most frequently used in event studies. The estimation equation is
Ri,t = αi + βiRm,t + εi,t
where
Ri,t = proportionate return on the stock of ﬁrm i from time t − 1 to time t.
Rm,t = proportionate return on the overall market from time t − 1 to time t.
Abnormal returns are calculated by estimating the parameters of the market model in some pre-
event equilibrium. Essentially, the abnormal return is the forecast error. The cumulative abnormal





That is, cumulative abnormal returns are the summation of abnormal returns over the event window.
For the analysis below the pre-event equilibrium is (-300, -20), measured in trading days, and the
abnormal returns are calculated for event windows of 1, 3, 5, and 11 trading days around the event
date. I use the Equal Weighted Market Return for Rm, as deﬁned by CRSP.
B Probability of Validity
The speciﬁcation for estimating the probability of validity is based on Marco (2004) and Lanjouw
and Schankerman (2001). I base the probability of validity on observable patent characteristics as
well as observable case characteristics. Patent data for my sample were obtained from the NBER
Patent Citations Data Files, described in Hall, Jaﬀe, and Trajtenberg (2001). The variables used
are described in Table (3).
Forward citations are citations received by a patent from subsequently issued patents. Similarly,
backward citations are those made by the patent to previously issued patents. Patent applicants
are required to cite “prior art” including previously issued patents. Failure to do so is grounds
for invalidity if the omission is later discovered (Allison and Lemley). Hall, Jaﬀe, and Trajtenberg
describe the creation of several indices in the NBER data using patent citations, including generality
and originality (Jaﬀe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson 1993).






where sij refers to the proportion of forward citations to patent i from patents in technology class j.
The higher the index, the more spread out are the patents that cite it, technologically speaking (Hall,
Jaﬀe, and Trajtenberg). Originality is similarly deﬁned, except that s refers to backward citations
rather than forward citations. Higher originality indicates that a wider array of technologies were
utilized in creating the innovation.
Both generality and originality are undeﬁned if the number of citations is zero. In my sample,
undeﬁned values are replaced by zero. In the case of generality this assignment makes sense in that
an uncited patent is not applicable to any patented technologies (yet), and therefore receives a low
score for generality. Alternatively, the patent may just be very young. In the case of originality,
one could imagine that highly original patents might cite no previous patents. However, from an
empirical standpoint, Hall, Jaﬀe, and Trajtenberg observe that higher numbers of citations tend to
be associated with higher originality and generality indices; thus, assigning zero to undeﬁned values
seems the logical choice.
Self-citations are another important measure in the patent literature. The NBER dataset deﬁnes
two self-citation variables, reﬂecting the proportion of forward citations that are made by the patent
holder itself. Since the identity of patent holders is subject to error, an upper bound and a lower
bound are deﬁned. Missing values for the self-citation variables will obtain whenever there are no
forward citations. In these cases, I replace missing lower (upper) bound values with zero (one), since
this is the theoretical lower (upper) bound.
Table (4) shows the results of a simple probit on the probability of validity. Since the cases are
subject to selection, the predicted probability of validity must be interpreted as the probability of
validity conditional on being litigated (Marco 2004). For the current application, the conditional
probability is appropriate because I want to measure the probability the day before the court’s
decision. At that point in time it is known that the patent has been litigated. Thus, using a
selection-corrected unconditional probability would cause a bias.
The estimates are used to construct a predicted probability of validity. That variable is used as
a dependent variable in the structural estimations in Section (5).
22Table 1: Adjudication data
Sample Obs Percent
Total patents 417,735 --
Litigated patents 1252 0.3%
Adjudicated patents 413 33.0%
Decision-patents 610
Returns data (adjudication) 475
Validity rulings 303
Valid 177 58.4%
Not Valid 126 41.6%
Returns data (appl./issuance) 179
23Table 2: Excess returns
Event
Window Obs Mean Std.Err.
Adjudications
Valid
Returns (%) 2 55 -0.19 0.28 -0.76 0.38
11 55 1.52 0.81 -0.11 3.15
Dollars ($millions) 2 55 -23.0 11.7 -46.4 0.3
11 55 61.5 46.1 -30.8 153.8
Not Valid
Returns (%) 2 45 -0.64 0.30 -1.23 -0.04
11 45 -0.82 0.54 -1.92 0.28
Dollars ($millions) 2 45 10.2 28.2 -46.6 67.0
11 45 -10.7 58.6 -128.9 107.4
Patent issuance
Application date
Returns (%) 2 181 -0.05 0.17 -0.38 0.28
11 181 1.10 0.39 0.32 1.87
Dollars ($millions) 2 181 -14.1 11.8 -37.4 9.3
11 181 31.1 22.2 -12.7 75.0
Issue date
Returns (%) 2 198 -0.31 0.19 -0.69 0.07
11 198 1.41 0.60 0.23 2.59
Dollars ($millions) 2 198 6.5 7.8 -9.0 22.0
11 198 30.0 13.3 3.9 56.2
Notes:
Adjudication data excludes multiple patents-in-suit adjudications
Event [95% Conf. Interval]
24Table 3: Variables used to calculate the probability of validity
Dependent indicator variables
V Indicates a positive validity ruling
Independent
Court indicator variables
DEFENSIVE Indicates the patent holder is the defendant
APPEAL Indicates an appellate decision
PRIORPOS Indicates there was a prior positive decision on validity (infringement)
PRIORNEG Indicates there was a prior negative decision on validity (infringement)
PRE82CASE Indicates case filed prior to 1982
Citation
BACKWARD Number of backward citations per claim
FORWARD Average number of forward citations per claim per year
SELF Proportion of forward citations that are self-citations
GENERAL NBER "Generality" index. Undefined values set to 0
ORIGINAL NBER "Originality" index. Undefined values set to 0
Scope
NUMIPC Number of 4-digit International Patent Classes
LOGCLAIM Number of patent claims
Technology
CHEM Chemicals. NBER technology category = 1
COMP Computers and communication. NBER technology category = 2
MED Drugs and medical. NBER technology category = 3
ELEC Electronics. NBER technology category = 4
MECH Mechanical. NBER technology category = 5
Other
PATDELAY Time between patent application and patent grant
FOREIGN Indicates non-US patentee
PRE82PAT Indicates patent application dated prior to 1982
AGE Age of the patent from patent application to case filing
25Table 4: Probability of validity
Variable Coef. Std. Err.
DEFENSIVE -0.099 (0.287)
APPEAL -0.535 ** (0.217)
PRIORPOS 1.244 *** (0.314)
PRIORNEG -0.448 (0.273)




















AGE 0.143 ** (0.063)
AGE






Standard errors in parentheses
* signif. at 10%; ** signif. at 5%; *** signif. at 1%
26Table 5: Structural estimations
Equation/Parameter
Win rate (Valid)
w10 Constant .77 *** .83 *** .70 *** 1.03 ***
(.02) (.03) (.01) (.25)
w11 Appeal --      -.20 *** --      -.10
(.04) (.14)
w12 Pre-1982 --      -2.56 --      -.10
(2.66) (.13)
Win rate (invalid)
w20 Constant .19 *** .18 ** -1.08 .03
(.07) (.08) (.85) (.12)
w21 Appeal --      -.13 --      -.50 ***
(.08) (.16)
w22 Pre-1982 --      -.92 --      .23 *
(.97) (.13)
Patent value
b0 Constant .16 *** .16 *** -264,194. *** -147,469. ***
(.01) (.02) (45,200.) (45,373.)
b1 Appl. Returns -.36 *** -.19 2.00 *** 3.85 ***
(.10) (.13) (.22) (.65)
b2 Iss. Returns .82 *** .87 *** 3.36 *** 5.09 ***
(.10) (.10) (.30) (.45)
b3 Forward citations .013 *** .007 *** 45,559. *** 32,651. ***
(.001) (.001) (6,432.) (8,728.)
b4 Age -.050 *** -.041 *** 37,891. *** 13,190.
(.004) (.004) (11,888.) (11,977.)
b5 Age squared .003 *** .002 *** 1,530. ** 1,764. ***
(.000) (.000) (645.) (655.)
Dependent variable: Excess Returns ([1] & [2]) or Dollars ([3] & [4]).
Bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses.
*** significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; * significant at the 0.01 level.
Coefficients and standard errors based on mean and standard errors of 200 bootstrap replicates.
Linear specification for court error
Excess Returns Dollars
[4] [3] [2] [1]
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29Table 6: Structural estimates
Equation/Parameter
Win rate (valid patents)
w10 Constant 1.42 *** .96 *** .95 *** 1.11 ***
(.08) (.09) (.18) (.09)
w11 Appeal --      -.82 *** --      .70 ***
(.11) (.16)
w12 Pre-1982 --      .12 --      -.54 ***
(.13) (.10)
Win rate (invalid patents)
w20 Constant -.50 *** .28 *** -2.92 *** -1.38
(.06) (.10) (.42) (1.07)
w21 Appeal --      -1.48 *** --      -1.81 ***
(.14) (.31)
w22 Pre-1982 --      .75 *** --      1.38 *
(.14) (.80)
Patent value
b0 Constant .15 *** .32 *** -287,969. *** -356,514. ***
(.01) (.02) (56,954.) (51,006.)
b1 Appl. Returns -.31 ** -.07 2.12 *** 7.15 ***
(.12) (.16) (.27) (.85)
b2 Iss. Returns .98 *** 1.43 *** 4.17 *** 7.28 ***
(.09) (.11) (.29) (.63)
b3 Forward citations .014 *** .006 *** 59,854. *** 58,981. ***
(.001) (.001) (6,385.) (12,543.)
b4 Age -.048 *** -.078 *** 38,205. ** 55,661. ***
(.003) (.004) (14,949.) (13,533.)
b5 Age squared .003 *** .004 *** 2,073. *** 359.
(.000) (.000) (766.) (757.)
Dependent variable: Excess Returns ([5] & [6]) or Dollars ([7] & [8]).
Bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses.
*** significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; * significant at the 0.01 level.
Coefficients and standard errors based on mean and standard errors of 200 bootstrap replicates.
Logit specification for court error
Excess Returns Dollars
[5] [6] [7] [8]
30Table 7: Structural estimates
Equation/Parameter
Win rate (valid)
w10 Constant .81 *** 1.18 *** .75 *** 1.49 ***
(.02) (0.09) (.02) (0.19)
Win rate (invalid)
w20 Constant .22 * -.33 *** .045 -2.07 ***
(.11) (.08) (.045) (0.33)
Patent Value
b0 Constant .30 .03 -30,443. 30,149.
(.22) (.19) (71,466.) (32,432.)
b1 Appl. Returns -.81 16.6 11.1 *** 8.74 ***
(5.79) (10.3) (3.3) (2.98)
b2 Iss. Returns 19.1 ** 34.9 10.8 *** 6.88 ***
(7.7) (21.3) (2.2) (1.55)
b3 Forward citations .051 .058 134,208. ** 52,037. *
(.094) (.152) (63,262.) (31,306.)
r Dep. rate .26 *** .27 *** .074 *** .017
(.03) (.03) (.021) (.020)
Dependent variable: Excess Returns ([9] & [10]) or Dollars ([11] & [12]).
Bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses.
*** significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; * significant at the 0.01 level.
Coefficients and standard errors based on mean and standard errors of 200 bootstrap replicates.
Linear/logit specifications for court error.
[12] [9] [10] [11]
Alternative specification for patent value
Excess Returns Dollars
Logit Linear Logit Linear
31